

INTERNATIONAL SECURITY AND COUNTER TERRORISM ALERT SERVICE Number 1, 2006

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UNITED NATIONS

• THE IMPERATIVE FOR ACTION: AN UPDATE OF THE REPORT OF THE TASK FORCE ON AMERICAN INTERESTS AND UN REFORM.

Task Force on the United Nations. November 2005.

A follow-up to the congressionally mandated report issued in June 2005 by the bipartisan Task Force on the United Nations co-chaired by Newt Gingrich and George Mitchell, this report assesses what was or was not achieved at the September UN summit meeting, and what should be done next. Like the June report, this progress report is written from an American perspective. The Task Force believes, however, that reforming the United Nations is not a favor to the United States, but an effort to advance goals that are widely shared by the members of the United Nations -- some two-thirds of whom are now electoral democracies. The report is divided into five sections -- human rights and genocide; management reform; weapons of mass destruction proliferation; preventing and ending conflicts; and development and humanitarian assistance. http://www.usip.org/un/un_update.pdf [pdf format, 49 pages]

TERRORISM

• NATIONAL MILITARY STRATEGIC PLAN FOR THE WAR ON TERRORISM U.S. Department of Defense. February 2006

The National Military Strategic Plan For The War On Terrorism (NMSP-WOT) constitutes the comprehensive military plan to prosecute the Global War on Terrorism for the Armed Forces of the United States. This document reflects the lessons of the first four years of the Global War on Terrorism, including the findings and recommendations of the 9-11 Commission and a rigorous examination within the Department of Defense, personally led by the Secretary of Defense and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The NMSP-WOT outlines the Department's strategic planning and provides strategic

guidance for military activities and operations in the Global War on Terrorism. The document guides the planning and actions of the Combatant Commands, the Military Departments, Combat Support Agencies and Field Support Activities of the United States to protect and defend the homeland, attack terrorists and their capacity to operate effectively at home and abroad, and support mainstream eforts to reject violent extremism.

http://www.defenselink.mil/pubs/pdfs/2006-01-25-Strategic-Plan.pdf [pdf format, 40 pages]

• THE NEW CHILDREN OF TERROR: THE MAKING OF A TERRORIST: RECRUITMENT, TRAINING, AND ROOT CAUSES

The Brookings Institution, Saban Center for Middle East Policy. December 2005

"Terrorism, it is said, is the 'weapon of the weak.' But while our conception of warfare is often an assumption of men in uniform fighting for the political cause of their nationstates, it is a misnomer. The reality of contemporary conflict is that increasingly it has pulled in the 'weak' of society, most specifically children, both as targets and participants. Although there is global consensus (based on moral grounds) against sending children into battle, this terrible practice is now a regular facet of contemporary wars. There are some 300,000 children (both boys and girls) under the age of 18 presently serving as combatants, fighting in almost 75 percent of the world's conflicts; 80 percent of these conflicts where children are present include fighters under the age of fifteen. Thus, while it may be disturbing, it should be no surprise that children are also present in the dark terrorist domain of modern global conflict. As on the world's battlefields, children are increasingly present in terrorist groups. Many of these groups have long had "youth wings" to provide broader support in the populace, but now youths are increasingly being used in actual operations to strike at targets behind the battle lines. This occurs for the same fundamental reasons that children are now on the battlefields: Children offer terrorist group leaders cheap and easy recruits, who provide new options to strike at their foes." (Book chapter: The Making of a Terrorist) http://www.brookings.edu/views/papers/singer/chapter8 20051215.pdf [pdf format, 20 pages]

• A HUNDRED OSAMAS: ISLAMIST THREATS AND THE FUTURE OF COUNTERINSURGENCY.

Sherifa D. Zuhur.

United States Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute (SSI). December 2005.

The monograph's title refers to President Hosni Mubarak's prediction that American involvement in Iraq would give rise to a 'hundred Osamas.' The author, a Visiting Professor of National Security Affairs at the Strategic Studies Institute, explores 'the new jihad' and the regeneration of Islamist insurgencies and extremist movements in the context of religious and political movements throughout the Muslim world. She describes the contributions of various Islamist leaders to this discourse of extremism, and how their strategies of recruitment, retention and engagement function. She examines various U.S. responses to extremists, and proposes new elements of a counterstrategy.

http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.armv.mil/pdffiles/PUB636.pdf [pdf format, 84 pages]

ASSESSING THE BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS AND BIOTERRORISM THREAT
Milton Leitenberg

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Research at 2005.

United States Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute (SSI). December 2005

"It is nearly 15 years since biological weapons (BW) have become a significant national security preoccupation. This occurred primarily due to circumstances occurring within a short span of years. First was the official U.S. Government suggestion that proliferation of offensive BW programs among states and even terrorist groups was an increasing trend; second was the discovery, between 1989 and 1992, that the USSR had violated the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC) since its ratification in 1975 by building a massive covert biological weapons program; third was the corroboration by the UN Special Commission in 1995 that Iraq had maintained a covert biological weapons program since 1974, and had produced and stockpiled large quantities of agents and delivery systems between 1988 and 1991; and, fourth was the discovery, also in 1995, that the Japanese Aum Shinrikyo group, which had carried out the nerve gas attack in the Tokyo subway system, also had spent 4 years attempting—albeit unsuccessfully—to produce and disperse two pathogenic biological agents. The distribution of professionally prepared anthrax spores through the U.S. postal system in the weeks afterwards September 11, 2001, magnified previous concerns by orders of magnitude. In December 2002. after U.S. forces had overrun much of the territory of Afghanistan, it was discovered that the al-Qaida organization also had spent several years trying to obtain the knowledge and means to produce biological agents. These new factors shifted the context in which BW was considered almost entirely to "bioterrorism." Within 4 years, almost \$30 billion in federal expenditure was appropriated to counter the anticipated threat. This response took place in the absence of virtually any threat analysis. The purpose of this monograph is to begin to fill that gap."

http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdffiles/PUB639.pdf [pdf format, 125 pages]

IRAQ

• TRIAL OF SADDAM HUSSEIN Library of Congress. 2005-2006

"This website is intended to provide the viewer with essential information related to the relevant trials. It will also set out a selection of reference materials that will further explain important aspects of the trials. In making this selection, the Law Library of Congress does not endorse or attest to the authenticity of any such referenced materials or information. In addition to viewers in general, the following of the development of the trial of Saddam Hussein, which started in October 2005, may be of special interest to legal scholars of international criminal law and the seekers of universal justice." http://www.loc.gov/law/public/saddam/ [several html documents]

• IRAQI FORCE DEVELOPMENT: A CURRENT STATUS REPORT; JULY-DECEMBER 2005.

Anthony Cordesman.

Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS). January 2006.

This report is an excerpt of a book-length report on the development of Iraqi forces. It focuses on recent events and the political impact of the election on Iraqi force developments. The author argues that in spite of the problems facing Iraqi forces, they have made major progress. Changes in the US-led Coalition advisory effort have led to steadily higher selection and training standards and better equipment and facilities. Moreover, this progress has occurred in spite of the fact that the Sunni Arab insurgents focused their attacks on fellow Iraqis and hit hard at every element of Iraqi forces. However, he notes that such progress is not yet sufficient to guarantee either any meaningful force of Iraqi victory, or the ability of the US to make major troop withdrawals and still claim success. He identifies problems in shaping effective Iraqi forces that must still be addressed. These include:

- * Ensuring that Iraqi forces will act as national forces, and not Shi'ite and Kurdish forces;
- * Giving Iraqi combat battalions better balance and support;
- * Giving the security and police forces the same level of training and advisory support as the regular Iraqi forces;
- * Matching force development with political development and inclusiveness; and
- * Supporting Iraqi forces with effective governance by civil authorities http://www.csis.org/media/csis/pubs/060118_iraqforceupdate.pdf [pdf format, 121 pages]

IRAN

 IRAN'S NUCLEAR PROGRAM: RECENT DEVELOPMENTS Sharon Squassoni CRS Report for Congress. February 2006

International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) inspections since 2003 have revealed almost two decades' worth of undeclared nuclear activities in Iran, including uranium enrichment and plutonium separation efforts. Iran's actions to conceal and restrict access for IAEA inspectors have eroded international confidence in Iran's peaceful intentions. Iran agreed in 2003 to suspend its enrichment and reprocessing activities in exchange for promises of assistance from Germany, France, and the UK (EU-3), but negotiations broke down in August 2005. On September 24, 2005, the IAEA Board of Governors found Iran to be in noncompliance with its Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) safeguards agreement (GOV/2005/77). Following Iran's decision to resume enrichment research and development in January 2006, the IAEA Board voted (GOV/2006/14) on February 4 to report Iran to the U.N. Security Council. Many expect the Security Council to take up the issue in March.

http://fpc.state.gov/documents/organization/62749.pdf [pdf format, 6 pages]

LATIN AMERICA

 LATIN AMERICA: TERRORISM ISSUES Mark P. Sullivan CRS Report for Congress. January 2006 In the aftermath of the September 2001 terrorist attacks on New York and Washington D.C., U.S. attention to terrorism in Latin America intensified, with an increase in bilateral and regional cooperation. Latin American nations strongly condemned the attacks, and took action through the Organization of American States (OAS) to strengthen hemispheric cooperation. In June 2002, OAS members signed an Inter-American Convention against Terrorism. President Bush submitted the convention to the Senate in November 2002; on October 7, 2005, the Senate agreed to the resolution of advice and consent on the convention. In its annual report on global terrorism, the State Department highlights threats in Colombia, Peru, and the tri-border area of Argentina, Brazil, and Paraguay. The State Department also has designated four terrorist groups (three in Colombia and one in Peru) as Foreign Terrorist Organizations, and Cuba has been listed as a state sponsor of terrorism since 1982. In the second session of the 109th Congress, issues of concern will likely include continued Latin American cooperation on terrorism and oversight related to the release of the State Department's annual report on global terrorism expected in April 2006.

http://fpc.state.gov/documents/organization/62668.pdf [pdf format, 6 pages]

BOLIVIA'S CRISIS OF GOVERNANCE.

Peter DeShazo and Phillip McLean.

Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS). December 2005.

On December 2, 2005, the CSIS Americas Program held a conference to examine Bolivia's crisis of governance -- to analyze why it occurred and what steps can be taken to promote more effective and legitimate institutions of government. More broadly, the conference organizers sought to provide policymakers in a wide variety of fields with an analysis of the challenges involved in promoting effective governance in a multiethnic, developing country. The event featured panel discussions led by six experts from the academic, government, and media fields. This report summarizes the panelists' discussions and conclusions. As Bolivia's general elections occurred December 18, remarks by panelists referring to the elections were made without knowledge of the results.

http://www.csis.org/media/csis/pubs/ppa_v16_3.pdf [pdf format, 17 pages]

MIDDLE EAST

U.S. AID TO THE PALESTINIANS
 Jeremy M. Sharp
 CRS Report for Congress. February 2006

With the recent success of Hamas at the polls, many observers have cautioned that continued foreign assistance to the Palestinian Authority (PA) may be at risk due to Hamas' commitment to the destruction of the state of Israel and its designation as a terrorist group by the United States. Currently, the Palestinians are the largest per capita recipients of foreign aid worldwide and, with a shattered economy, are completely dependent on external support to meet basic needs. Without Western aid, a Hamas-led government may be forced to rely completely on donations from wealthy Arab Gulf states or from Iran. On the other hand, the prospect of losing U.S. and European aid

may force Hamas to tone down its radical views and accept Israel's right to exist. In the meantime, foreign donors have been cautious, demanding that Hamas renounce the use of violence and recognize Israel while withholding a complete cessation of aid programs pending the formation of a new Palestinian government.

http://fpc.state.gov/documents/organization/60396.pdf [pdf format, 6 pages]

• WILLING TO COMPROMISE: PALESTINIAN PUBLIC OPINION AND THE PEACE PROCESS.

Khalil Shikaki.

United States Institute of Peace (USIP). January 2006.

In this report, Khalil Shikaki, one of the foremost authorities on Palestinian public opinion and Palestinian national politics, analyzes survey data gathered from dozens of polls conducted over the past decade. He identifies long-term trends in Palestinian public opinion and related policy implications. His study is the latest publication in The United States Institute of Peace's Project on Arab-Israeli Futures -- a research effort designed to anticipate and assess obstacles and opportunities facing the peace process in the years ahead. The effort brings together American, Israeli, and Arab researchers, and is directed by a senior USIP research associate. Principal findings of his study include:

- * Palestinian public opinion is not an impediment to progress in the peace process; to the contrary, over time the Palestinian public has become more moderate.
- * For the first time since the start of the peace process, a majority of Palestinians support a compromise settlement that is acceptable to a majority of Israelis.
- * Palestinian opposition to violence increases when diplomacy proves effective. Public support for violence increases in an environment of greater pain and suffering and decreases when threat perception is reduced.
- * All major transformations in Palestinian politics were preceded or accompanied by changes in public attitudes.
- * By reducing threat perception, political and security stability has the advantage of reducing the appeal of violence and improving the prospects for Palestinian democracy. But only progress in the peace process can sustain such stability. http://www.usip.org/pubs/specialreports/sr158.pdf [pdf format, 16 pages]
- FATAH AND HAMAS: THE NEW PALESTINIAN FACTIONAL REALITY Aaron D. Pina
 CRS Report for Congress. March 2006

For the first time in its history, the Palestinian parliament is set to be led by Hamas, which the United States and European Union have designated a foreign terrorist organization. Although some lauded the generally free and fair election in January 2006, others criticized the outcome and accused Hamas of "hijacking" democracy. This report provides an overview of the new political realities in the West Bank and Gaza after the election, the challenges Fatah and Hamas face, and possible implications for U.S. policy.

http://fpc.state.gov/documents/organization/62834.pdf [pdf format, 6 pages]

• RUSSIA'S WRONG DIRECTION: WHAT THE UNITED STATES CAN AND SHOULD DO.

Independent Task Force.

Council on Foreign Relations (CFR). March 2006.

Chaired by former U.S. Senator John Edwards, and former Congressman and Housing and Urban Development Secretary Jack Kemp, this Independent Task Force was established by CFR in 2005 to take stock of developments in Russia, assess the U.S.-Russian relationship, and offer a broad strategy and set of recommendations for U.S. policymakers. The Task Force report's opening premise is that sustaining cooperation with Russia remains important to the United States. Fruitful cooperation has been achieved on such issues as preventing terrorists from acquiring weapons of mass destruction, Iran, energy, and HIV/AIDS. On the other hand, the report enumerates growing areas of U.S.-Russian disagreement concerning Russia's political system, energy export policy, and policies toward other post-Soviet states. To the Task Force, these disagreements indicate that U.S.-Russian relations are headed in the wrong direction, and the "very idea of 'strategic partnership' no longer seems realistic." The report asserts that while a partnership with Russia is the right long-term goal, "it is unfortunately not a realistic prospect for U.S.-Russian relations over the next several vears." The real Russia-related question the United States faces in this period is "how to make selective cooperation -- and in some cases selective opposition -- serve important international goals." The report outlines Task Force recommendations in three major categories of U.S.-Russian relations - security; energy, trade, and environmental cooperation; and dealing with an authoritarian Russia. An appendix of Task Force members' "Additional or Dissenting Views" is also contained in this report. http://www.cfr.org/content/publications/attachments/Russia TaskForce.pdf [pdf format, 94 pages]

NORTH KOREA

• THE SIX PARTY TALKS AND BEYOND: COOPERATIVE THREAT REDUCTION AND NORTH KOREA.
Joel S. Wit, Jon Wolfsthal, and Choong-suk Oh.
Center for Strategic and International Studies. December 2005.

The authors outline the reasons why multilateral, cooperative threat reduction should play an important role in future efforts to eliminate the threat posed by North Korean weapons programs; why it is possible to work cooperatively with Pyongyang under the right circumstances; the potential contributions of key countries to this effort; and a series of possible threat reduction projects covering nuclear, missile and chemical/biological weapons. In their estimation, the elimination of these threats will require a series of diplomatic agreements, perhaps stretching out over the next decade, at a cost of hundreds of millions of dollars. The Beijing Six-Party Talks represents the beginning of that effort, dealing with the immediate threat posed by Pyongyang's nuclear weapons program. The authors conclude that integrating cooperative threat reduction programs into those talks and any subsequent agreements would serve the interests of the United States and other participants in those negotiations, as well as those of North Korea.

http://www.csis.org/media/csis/pubs/051216 ctr.pdf [pdf format, 92 pages]